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1. Introduction 
The European Union has had a clear-cut 
competency to deal with immigration since the 
entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam in 
1999. Since then, addressing irregular immigration, 
including the repatriation of irregular residents, has 
been a central part of the EU’s common 
immigration policy. The EU always defended the 
idea that an effective returns policy was key to 
ensuring public support for other elements in the 
policy, such as legal migration and asylum.
1 It was 
understood that third-country nationals who did not 
have a legal status enabling them to stay in the EU, 
either on a temporary or a permanent basis, should 
leave. A credible threat of a forced return, it was 
inferred, would send a clear message to potential 
irregular migrants that irregular entry into the EU 
would not lead to fixed residence.
2 With that 
                                                      
1 European Commission, Communication on Policy 
Priorities in the Fight against Illegal Immigration of Third-
Country Nationals, COM (2006) 402, Brussels, 
19.07.2006. 
2 European Commission, Communication on a Community 
Return Policy on Illegal Residents, COM (2002) 564, 
Brussels, 14.10.2002. 
premise in mind, the EU began to adopt different 
legal instruments to deal with irregular 
immigration from 2000 on.
3 This process 
culminated in the adoption of the Returns Directive 
in 2008, as discussed below. 
This Directive was widely criticised by 
commentators both within and outside the 
European Union. For instance, the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Human Rights censured it, 
arguing that it was difficult to combine the 
measure with the protection of individuals.
4 Even 
more notable were the critiques from Latin 
America, which is a region that the EU has 
recently recognised as a ‘strategic partner’.
5 
                                                      
3 D. Acosta (2009), “The Good, the Bad and the Ugly in 
EU Migration Law: Is the European Parliament Becoming 
Bad and Ugly? (The Adoption of Directive 2008/115: The 
Returns Directive)”, European Journal of Migration and 
Law, Vol. 11 (1), pp. 19-39, at 22-23. 
4 M. Ilies (2009), Irregular Immigration Policy in the 
European Community: Action at All Stages of the Irregular 
Migration Flow (WP), Working Paper 38/2009, Real 
Instituto Elcano, 17 July, p. 13. 
5 See for instance the Lima Declaration, “Addressing our 
Peoples’ Priorities Together”, Fifth Latin America and 
Caribbean-European Union Summit, Lima, 16 May 2008.  2 | DIEGO ACOSTA ARCARAZO 
 
This paper deals with two issues. First, it 
acknowledges the effect that measures such as the 
Returns Directive has on the external relations and 
image of the European  Union abroad.
6 This is 
important in light of the future adoption of the new 
multiannual programme in the area of freedom, 
security and justice (the Stockholm programme) 
and the emphasis it places on consolidating a 
global approach in the management of a common 
immigration policy. Second, it scrutinises the way 
in which member states are implementing this 
particular Directive and recommends options to 
transpose it, taking into consideration the concerns 
expressed by Latin America. This is also relevant 
if the European Union and its member states are 
willing to show a commitment to the political 
compromises adopted with strategic partners such 
as Latin America. 
In order to do that, the main characteristics of the 
Directive are outlined below. The most important 
critiques from Latin America to its adoption are 
then presented, as are the responses that the 
European Parliament and the Spanish government 
gave to those concerns. Next, the way in which 
some member states, notably Spain, Italy and 
Portugal, are implementing the Directive are 
considered (these member states are relevant 
because of the high number of Latin American 
citizens residing there). The paper ends with some 
conclusions and policy recommendations. 
2.  The adoption of the Returns 
Directive 
The Directive on common standards and 
procedures in member states for returning illegally
7 
staying third-country nationals
8 (hereafter the 
Returns Directive) was officially published on 24 
December 2008 following its approval by the 
European Parliament on 18 June 2008 and its 
formal adoption by the Council on 9 December 
2008.
9 The Returns Directive is the first important 
                                                      
6 See E. Guild, S. Carrera and A. Faure Atger, Challenges 
and Prospects for the EU´s Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice: Recommendations to the European Commission 
for the Stockholm Programme, CEPS Working Document 
No. 313, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels, 
April 2009, p. 17. 
7 The term irregular or undocumented migrant will be used 
throughout this document. 
8 OJ 2008, L 348, 24.12.2008, p. 98. The Directive is 
applicable to all the EU member states except for the 
United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark. 
9 For an analysis of the negotiations see D. Acosta (2009), 
“The Good, the Bad and the Ugly in EU Migration Law: Is 
the European Parliament Becoming Bad and Ugly? (The 
Adoption of Directive 2008/115: The Returns Directive)”, 
immigration instrument adopted under the co-
decision procedure.  
The objective of the Directive is to set out 
“common standards and procedures to be applied 
in Member States for returning illegally staying 
third-country nationals” (Art. 1). The concept of 
return includes the country of origin, a transit 
country or any other country to which the irregular 
migrant voluntarily decides to return and in which 
he or she will be accepted. The Directive deals 
with a number of issues regarding the return 
procedure. Among its most controversial 
provisions are the following: the exclusion of some 
irregular migrants from its scope, the possibility to 
detain a migrant for a period up to 18 months, the 
possibility of a re-entry ban into the EU for a 
period of 5 years and the chance to detain and 
return unaccompanied minors. On the positive 
side, the Directive prioritises a period of voluntary 
return ranging from 7 to 30 days, although in some 
cases this period might not be granted. Also, the 
Directive sets the obligation for member states to 
issue a return decision (Art. 6) although some 
exceptions apply, notably the possibility to grant a 
residence permit for compassionate, humanitarian 
or other reasons (Art. 6.4).
10 Finally, the Directive 
provides different guarantees for the irregular 
migrant during the whole procedure of expulsion, 
such as the respect of the principle of non-
refoulement (Art. 5), the possibility to appeal 
against a return decision (Art. 13) or certain 
guarantees regarding the detention of minors or 
families (Art. 17). 
3.  The reaction from Latin America 
The adoption of the Returns Directive elicited a 
tremendous amount of criticism, mainly from 
different international organisations and Latin 
American States. The latter constituted an 
unprecedented common reaction from this region 
to an EU measure. This is very relevant as Latin 
America is considered by the European Union to 
be a strategic partner. Immigration plays a crucial 
role in that partnership, as was well-reflected in the 
declaration of the last Latin America and 
                                                                                     
European Journal of Migration and Law, Vol. 11 (1), pp. 
19-39. 
10 For a concise analysis of the Directive see A. Baldaccini 
(2009), “The Return and Removal of Irregular Migrants 
under EU Law: An Analysis of the Returns Directive”, 
European Journal of Migration and Law, Vol. 11(1), pp 
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Caribbean-European Union summit in Lima in 
2008.
11 
In a very short period, between 9 June and 4 July 
2008, all the important regional actors rejected the 
Directive.  The Organization of American States 
(OAS) expressed its concerns in a resolution, and 
instructed its Secretary-General to accompany a 
high-level mission to the EU to learn about and 
discuss the implications of the Directive.
12 
MERCOSUR deplored the Directive and recalled 
the historical hospitality with which Latin 
American countries received migrants from Europe 
in the past.
13 The Union of South American 
Nations (UNASUR) issued a similar statement.
14 
Finally, the foreign ministries of the Andean 
Community addressed a letter to the European 
Union in which they declared the need for a 
common reflection on the negative consequences 
that this Directive would have on Latin American 
migrants in the European Union.
15 
At a parliamentary level, the Latin American 
Parliament (Parlatino),
16 the MERCOSUR 
Parliament (PARLASUR),
17 the Central American 
Parliament (PARLACEN)
18 and the Andean 
Parliament criticised the Directive for what they 
termed as restrictive and inhuman provisions.  
                                                      
11 Recital 27 of the Declaration was entirely devoted to 
immigration. It stated, among other things, that “We call 
our regions to further develop a structured and 
comprehensive dialogue … (that) will also address the 
issues of regular and irregular migration”.  
12 Permanent Council of the OAS, CP/RES. 938 (1654/08), 
‘OAS Action on the European Union’s Returns Directive 
on Migration Issues’, 26 June 2008. 
13 “Declaración de los países del MERCOSUR ante la 
Directiva de Retorno de la Unión Europea”, Tucumán 1 
July 2008. 
14  “Declaración de la Unión de Naciones Suramericanas 
sobre la ‘Directiva de Retorno’ de la Unión Europea”, 4 
July 2008 (http://www.comunidadandina.org/unasur/4-7-
08directivaUE.htm). 
15 “Communication from the Andean Community to the 
European Union”, 9 June 2008 
(http://www.comunidadandina.org/documentos/actas/ 
CartasCancilleres_TroikaUE_migraciones.pdf). 
16 “Declaración de la Mesa Directiva sobre la Directiva del 
Parlamento Europeo y el Consejo para el retorno de 
nacionales ilegales”, 3 July 2008 
(http://www.parlatino.org/web/presidencia/declaraciones/6
99-declaracion-mesa-directiva-parlatino.html). 
17 “Declaración en Defensa de los Derechos Humanos de 
los Migrantes”, MERCOSUL/PM/DECL. 10/2008, 27 June 
2008 (http://www.parlamentodelmercosur.org/archivos/ 
DECL.10%202008.pdf). 
18 “Pronunciamiento del Parlamento Centroamericano”, 30 
June 2008 (http://www.migrante.com.mx/pdf/ 
pronunciamiento.pdf).  
At an individual level, all governments in Latin 
America condemned the Directive for its 
repressiveness.
19 The Brazilian President, Luiz 
Inácio Lula da Silva, in a clear reference to the 
European Union, even declared this year that the 
recent legislation adopted in Brazil, by which 
thousands of undocumented migrants would obtain 
a regular status,
20 was a lesson to the developed 
countries.
21 
Also, a little bit later on 19 September 2008, the 
final declaration of the VIII South-American 
Conference on Migration, meeting in Montevideo, 
expressed its refusal of the Returns Directive “and 
the criminalization of migrants that might imply 
the application of this kind of rules…”
22 Moreover, 
it exhorted the European Union to regularise those 
migrants from South America in an undocumented 
situation.
23 
The harsher criticisms were mostly addressed to 
the European Parliament, which approved the 
Directive negotiated with the Council in its first 
reading, without introducing a single amendment. 
These criticisms were also directed at the Spanish 
government as it supported the Directive both in 
the Council and in the European Parliament. This 
has important consequences as Spain is the most 
important destination country of Latin American 
migrants in Europe, with almost 2 million coming 
from that area, some of whom are undocumented.
24 
These concerns meant that the European 
Parliament and the Spanish government took a 
                                                      
19 EU Observer, 23 June 2008, “Latin America Could Halt 
EU Trade Talks Over Return Directive”; “Carta abierta de 
Evo Morales a propósito de la ‘directiva retorno’ de la 
UE”, 12 June 2008 (http://www.telesurtv.net/noticias/ 
contexto/index.php?ckl=392). 
20 Brazilian Law No. 11.961/2009. 
21 El País, “Brasil Defiende su Amnistía a Inmigrantes”, 7 
July 2009 (http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/ 
Brasil/defiende/amnistia/inmigrantes/elpepuint/20090707el
pepuint_1/Tes). See also the Statement by Mr. Luiz Inácio 
Lula Da Silva, President of Brazil, addressing the ILO 
Summit on Global jobs crisis, 15 June 2009 
(http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---
dcomm/documents/statement/wcms_108182.pdf).  
22 Declaration of Montevideo, “Migration, Development 
and Human Rights of Migrants”, VIII South-American 
Conference on Migrations, Montevideo, Uruguay, 19 
September 2008, paragraph 5.  
23 Ibid., paragraph 10. 
24 C. González-Enríquez (2009), “Country Report Spain”, 
Undocumented Migration. Counting the Uncountable. 
Data and Trends across Europe [on line]. Clandestino 
(http://clandestino.eliamep.gr/wp-content/uploads/2009/02/ 
spain.pdf). 4 | DIEGO ACOSTA ARCARAZO 
 
leading role in trying to explain the Directive to its 
Latin American counterparts, as we will see below.  
There were some common elements in the 
documents adopted as a reaction to the Directive. 
First, most of them recalled the historical 
hospitality with which Latin America received 
European migrants in previous centuries.
25 Second, 
they almost unanimously made reference to the 
Lima Declaration, mentioned above.
26 This is 
significant as it reveals that Latin American 
countries attached greater importance to this 
political declaration than the European Union did. 
Third, some institutions went so far as to ask for 
the modification of the Directive itself.
27 At a more 
specific level, two institutions, the Latin American 
Parliament and the MERCOSUR Parliament, 
expressed their preoccupation about two particular 
issues: the possibility of detention for a period of 
up to 18 months and the likelihood of imposing a 
re-entry ban for 5 years. These two issues are 
intrinsically linked with the option that member 
states have of giving the irregular migrant a period 
of voluntary departure, as will be analysed below.  
4.  Reactions from the EU to the 
reactions from Latin America 
After the adoption of the Directive, both the 
European Parliament and the Spanish government 
felt the need to embark on a process of explaining 
the effects of the Directive to their Latin American 
counterparts.  
The European Parliament tried to reassure Latin 
America through the work of its Euro-Latin 
American Parliamentary Assembly.
28 Its two co-
presidents approved a declaration on 14 July 2008 
in which they recommended the intensification of 
political dialogue on the issue.
29 To that end, it was 
later decided in the meeting of the EuroLat 
                                                      
25 This was the case in the OAE, Parlacen, MERCOSUR, 
UNASUR, MERCOSUR Parliament and South-American 
conference on Migrations documents.  
26 This was the case in the OEA, Parlacen, MERCOSUR, 
Andean Community, Latin American Parliament and 
South-American conference on Migrations documents. 
27 This was the case in the Parlacen, MERCOSUR, 
MERCOSUR Parliament and South-American conference 
on Migrations documents.  
28 The Euro-Latin American Parliamentary Assembly - 
EuroLat was created in 2006 to bolster EU-Latin American 
relations. EuroLat is a joint multilateral Parliamentary 
Assembly composed of 150 members, 75 from the 




Executive Bureau in Antigua on 27 February 2009, 
in response to a Latin American proposal to set up 
a ‘Migration-ALC Working Group’. This working 
group comprises six members for each of the two 
components of the Assembly. Among the tasks that 
were assigned to the group were: the drawing up of 
fundamental principles on which to build a Euro-
Latin American consensus on migration, allowing 
differentiated special treatment when European 
migration legislation is being applied to emigrants 
from Latin America and the Caribbean; and the 
monitoring of the process whereby the Returns 
Directive will be transposed into the domestic 
legislation of the EU Member States.
30 The 
working group held its first meeting in Madrid in 
April 2009, but it seems that some of the MEPs 
who voted in favour of the Directive did not turn 
up, Thus, in order for it not to be a futile exercise, 
it is hoped that, following the recent European 
Parliament elections, the working group would at 
least serve the purpose of a forum of dialogue on 
these issues.  
Also, the bi-regional dialogue on migration 
between the countries of Latin America and the 
Caribbean was launched in June 2009, in order to 
fulfil the commitments of the Fifth EU-LAC 
Summit in Lima. This could be a starting point to 
prepare the next EU-LAC Madrid meeting in 2010. 
Regarding the Spanish government, its 
explanations of the Directive were two-fold: first it 
was argued that it would introduce better 
guarantees for irregular migrants in those member 
states of the EU that had a more restrictive 
legislation, for example, those in which it was 
possible to detain an irregular migrant for longer 
than 18 months.
31 The second argument that the 
Spanish government made in order to reassure its 
Latin American counterparts was that the Spanish 
legislation provided better guarantees than those in 
                                                      
30 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/intcoop/eurolat/ 
documents/press_statements/bureau_antigua_2009_en.pdf  
31 This argument is not so easily upheld. In fact, out of the 
eight countries that did not have a set detention limit, two 
are not bound by this Directive (Denmark and the UK) and 
two more (Finland, the Netherlands) never detained people 
for such a long period. There were only some cases of 
detention longer than 18 months in Bulgaria, Cyprus, 
Estonia and Sweden. See STEPS, The Conditions in 
Centres for Third Country Nationals (Detention Camps, 
Open Centres as well as Transit Centres and Transit 
Zones) with a Particular Focus on Provisions and 
Facilities for Persons with Special Needs in the 25 EU 
Member States (Brussels, European Parliament Committee 
on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, 2007).  LATIN AMERICAN REACTIONS TO THE ADOPTION OF THE RETURNS DIRECTIVE | 5 
 
the Directive. Thus, the Spanish authorities stated 
that internal legislation would not be changed.
32 
Far more important than these explanations is the 
way in which the Directive is being implemented 
in the internal legal orders. 
5.  The implementation of the Returns 
Directive 
As has already been mentioned, the two elements 
in the Directive that came in for the most criticism 
were the re-entry ban and detention. Both are 
intrinsically linked to the period of voluntary 
departure, which is a priority in the Directive.
33 In 
brief, if a period of voluntary departure is granted, 
the authorities will not be obliged to impose a re-
entry ban, and moreover, the migrant will not be 
detained. On the contrary, if that period is not 
granted or if the migrant does not leave in the 
period allowed, the national authorities will be 
obliged to impose a re-entry ban and detention will 
become a possibility provided that there are no less 
onerous measures that can be imposed. The period 
for voluntary departure may not be granted if there 
is a risk of the migrant absconding, when s/he 
poses a risk to public policy, public security or 
national security, or when an application for a legal 
stay has been dismissed as manifestly unfounded 
or fraudulent. Consequently, it is important to see 
the way in which member states are implementing 
the possibility to grant a period for voluntary 
departure. 
Spain is currently debating the amendments to its 
previous immigration legislation in Senate. The 
proposal put forward by the government introduces 
a new Article granting a period for voluntary 
departure that did not exist before.
34 The proposal 
establishes that this period will not be offered if the 
person might abscond, if he or she poses a risk to 
public policy, public security or national security, 
or if he or she impedes or makes his/her removal 
difficult. This last case is probably not in line with 
the Directive. Nevertheless, the proposal seems to 
go in the right direction in order to privilege 
voluntary departure. Furthermore, the maximum 
period for the imposition of the re-entry ban is 
                                                      
32  El País, “España Explica que Nunca va a Aplicar la 
Directiva de Retorno”, 8 August 2008 (www.elpais.es). 
33 See recital 10 of the Directive and Art. 7. 
34 Art. 63(bis) of the Proyecto de Ley Orgánica de reforma 
de la Ley Orgánica 4/2000, de 11 de enero, sobre derechos 
y libertades de los extranjeros en España y su integración 
social, Boletín Oficial de la CortesGenerales, 1 July 2009 
(http://www.intermigra.info/extranjeria/archivos/ 
legislacion/PROYLEY.pdf).  
reduced from ten to five years, except where the 
person poses a security risk. On the negative side, 
the period of detention is extended from 40 to 60 
days. 
Italy has partially implemented the Directive with 
its new Security Law.
35 Its implementation is a 
clear example of what member states should not 
do. First of all, it establishes that entering or 
staying in Italy without permission constitutes a 
crime punishable by a fine of €5,000 to €10,000. 
This has very important consequences as the 
Returns Directive provides in Art. 2(b) that 
“Member States may decide not to apply this 
Directive to third-country nationals who…(b) are 
subject to return as a criminal law sanction or as a 
consequence of a criminal law sanction, according 
to national law…” Secondly, the new law does not 
provide for a period of voluntary departure. 
Moreover, the re-entry ban can be applied for a 
minimum of 5 years up to 10 years. Finally, 
amongst other restrictive provisions, the legislation 
also lengthens the amount of time irregular 
migrants can spend in detention from 2 months to 
6 months.
36 This is important for Latin America as 
there are almost 200,000 citizens, mainly from 
Ecuador and Peru, residing in Italy.
37 In fact, 
Ecuador immediately condemned the legislation.
38 
Portugal is another major destination country for 
Latin American immigration, especially for 
Brazilians. Brazilians in fact constitute the biggest 
number of immigrants with around 100,000 out of 
fewer than 500,000.
39 The number of irregular 
migrants is difficult to determine. However, 
Brazilians constitute the most numerous nationality 
of the migrants found in an undocumented 
situation.
40 
In Portugal, Law 23/2007 regulates the entry and 
residence of foreign nationals.
41 This Law provides 
                                                      
35 Law 15 July 2009, No. 94, Disposizioni in materia di 
sicurezza publica. 
36 See Art. 14(5) as amended. 
37 B. Padilla and J. Peixoto (2007), Latin American 
Immigration to Southern Europe, Migration Policy 
Institute, 28 June. 
38 Secretaría Nacional del Migrante (SENAMI), “Ecuador 
Responsabiliza a Italia por sus Emigrantes”, 7 July 2009 
(http://www.senami.gov.ec/content/view/291/94/). 
39 Serviço de Estrangeiros e Fronteiras, “Relatório 
Immigração, Fronteiras e Asilo 2008.”, p. 28. 
40 Ibid., p 57. . 
41 Lei no 23/2007 de 4 de Julho “Aprova o regime jurídico 
de entrada, permanência, saída e afastamento de 
estrangeiros do território nacional”. 6 | DIEGO ACOSTA ARCARAZO 
 
for a maximum detention period of 60 days.
42 
There is a 5 year re-entry ban
43 and the period of 
voluntary departure is set between 10 and 20 
days.
44 According to official sources from the 
Portuguese Ministry of Interior there would be no 
changes to these provisions in the transposition of 
the Directive into national law.
45 Hence, the 
implementation of this Directive will produce no 
major legislative changes to the situation of those 
irregular migrants from Latin America present in 
Portugal, notably from Brazil.  
6. Conclusions  and 
recommendations 
The criticisms to the Returns Directive by Latin 
America are not ill-conceived. In the process of the 
externalisation of immigration control embraced 
by the European Union, this is the first serious 
challenge on international relations grounds. 
However, the European Union would ignore the 
Latin American criticisms at its peril. In fact, the 
recent implementation by some member states 
brings more negative than positive news for the 
rights of irregular migrants.
46 This goes against the 
final political statement included by the Council in 
the Directive, which declared that its 
implementation should not be used in itself as a 
reason to justify the adoption of provisions less 
favourable to persons to whom it applies. 
This matter is still very important for Latin 
American countries, as the recent Quito 
Declaration shows, in which the Returns Directive 
and some member states’ practices such as those of 
Italy are condemned.
47 In light of the above, a 
number of policy recommendations can be put 
forward: 
•  The Directive provides some possibilities for a 
generous implementation regarding the rights 
of irregular migrants. Significantly, Art. 4 
allows member states to apply or adopt more 
                                                      
42 Art 146 of Lei no 23/2007. 
43 Art 144 of Lei no 23/2007. 
44 Art 138 of Lei no 23/2007. 
45 Ministério da Administração Interna, “A nossa Opinião 
sobre a Directiva do Retorno”, 14 June 2008 
(http://opiniao.mai-gov.info/2008/06/14/a-nossa-opiniao-
sobre-a-directiva-do-retorno/). 
46 The Greek case may also be mentioned here. Art. 48 in 
Law 3772/2009, amending Art. 76 of the Law on 
Migration 3386/2005, allows for the extension from the 
previous 3 to 12 months of the period of detention for 
irregular migrants.  
47 Declaration of Quito, IX South-American Conference on 
Migrations, Quito, Ecuador, 22 September 2009. 
favourable provisions, provided they are 
compatible with the Directive. In turn, Art. 
6(4) establishes that member states may at any 
moment grant an autonomous residence permit 
for compassionate, humanitarian or other 
reasons. Finally, if return is the option adopted 
by a member state, it should nevertheless take 
place in a reasonable way. In that sense, it is 
important that member states prioritise the 
voluntary return as provided by the Directive 
and refrain from imposing a re-entry ban. This 
is also in line with what the Commission is 
proposing for the Stockholm programme.
48 In 
order to do that, member states should limit the 
cases in which a period for voluntary return is 
not given as well as interpret those cases 
restrictively. Also, member states have to 
comply with the obligation laid down in Art. 
8(6) of the Directive of providing “for an 
effective forced-return monitoring system”.  
•  Also, contrary to what Italy has done, member 
states should take into consideration the case 
law by the European Court of Justice by which 
it declared that when transposing a Directive 
they have “to refrain, during the period laid 
down therein for its implementation, from 
adopting measures liable seriously to 
compromise the result prescribed”.
49  
•  In that sense, by the end of 2010 the European 
Commission will have to see which member 
states are in breach of the Directive and take 
appropriate action under Art. 226. 
•  The European Union should think about the 
consequences of the message that it sends 
abroad, in particular to special partners, if it 
prioritises such issues as return of irregular 
migrants. This might have negative effects “in 
terms of the EU’s own credibility on human 
rights and the principle of solidarity in the 
world”.
50 
•  Finally, the Spanish Presidency of the 
European Union, which begins in January 
                                                      
48 Commission Communication, An area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice serving the citizen: Wider freedom in 
a safer environment COM(2009) 262, 10 June 2009, 
Brussels, p. 26. 
49 See Case C-129/96 Inter-Environnement Wallonie ASBL 
v Région wallonne, paragraph 50. 
50 E. Guild, S. Carrera and A. Faure Atger (2009), 
Challenges and Prospects for the EU´s Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice: Recommendations to the European 
Commission for the Stockholm Programme, CEPS 
Working Document No. 313, Centre for European Policy 
Studies, Brussels, April, p. 17. LATIN AMERICAN REACTIONS TO THE ADOPTION OF THE RETURNS DIRECTIVE | 7 
 
2010, could play a positive role in encouraging 
member states to implement the Directive 
using the less restrictive clauses provided in 
the Directive. In fact, the next EU-LAC 
summit will take place in Madrid on 18 May 
2010 and will provide an excellent opportunity 
for European governments to take the concerns 
of Latin America into consideration.  About CEPS
Place du Congrès 1 • B-1000 Brussels




Founded in Brussels in 1983, the Centre for 
European Policy Studies (CEPS) is among the 
most experienced and authoritative think 
tanks operating in the European Union today. 
CEPS serves as a leading forum for debate on 
EU affairs, but its most distinguishing feature 
lies in its strong in-house research capacity, 
complemented by an extensive network of 
partner institutes throughout the world.
Goals
•	 To	carry	out	state-of-the-art	policy	research	leading	
to	solutions	to	the	challenges	facing	Europe	today.
•	 To	achieve	high	standards	of	academic	excellence	
and	maintain	unqualified	independence.
•	 To	provide	a	forum	for	discussion	among	all	
stakeholders	in	the	European	policy	process.
•	 To	build	collaborative	networks	of	researchers,	
policy-makers	and	business	representatives	across	
the	whole	of	Europe.
•	 To	disseminate	our	findings	and	views	through	a	
regular	flow	of	publications	and	public	events.
Assets
•	 Complete	independence	to	set	its	own	research	
priorities	and	freedom	from	any	outside	influence.
•	 Formation	of	nine	different	research	networks,	
comprising	research	institutes	from	throughout	
Europe	and	beyond,	to	complement	and	
consolidate	CEPS	research	expertise	and	to	greatly	
extend	its	outreach.
•	 An	extensive	membership	base	of	some	120	
Corporate	Members	and	130	Institutional	
Members,	which	provide	expertise	and	practical	
experience	and	act	as	a	sounding	board	for	the	
utility	and	feasability	of	CEPS	policy	proposals.
Programme Structure
CEPS	carries	out	its	research	via	its	own	in-house	
research	programmes	and	through	collaborative	
research	networks	involving	the	active	participation	of	
other	highly	reputable	institutes	and	specialists.
Research	Programmes
Economic	&	Social	Welfare	Policies
Energy,	Climate	Change	&	Sustainable	Development
EU	Neighbourhood,	Foreign	&	Security	Policy
Financial	Markets	&	Taxation
Justice	&	Home	Affairs
Politics	&	European	Institutions
Regulatory	Affairs
Trade,	Development	&	Agricultural	Policy
Research	Networks/Joint	Initiatives
Changing	Landscape	of	Security	&	Liberty	(CHALLENGE)
European	Capital	Markets	Institute	(ECMI)
European	Climate	Platform	(ECP)
European	Credit	Research	Institute	(ECRI)
European	Network	of	Agricultural	&	Rural	Policy	Research	
Institutes	(ENARPRI)
European	Network	for	Better	Regulation	(ENBR)
European	Network	of	Economic	Policy	Research	Institutes	
(ENEPRI)
European	Policy	Institutes	Network	(EPIN)
European	Security	Forum	(ESF)
CEPS	also	organises	a	variety	of	activities	and	special	
events,	involving	its	members	and	other	stakeholders	
in	the	European	policy	debate,	national	and	EU-level	
policy-makers,	academics,	corporate	executives,	NGOs	
and	the	media.	CEPS’	funding	is	obtained	from	a	
variety	of	sources,	including	membership	fees,	project	
research,	foundation	grants,	conferences	fees,	publi-
cation	sales	and	an	annual	grant	from	the	European	
Commission.